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1 Introduction
It is well-known that changes in the age structure of the population can have
dramatic consequences for public finances. For example, under a pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) scheme, changing demographics may lead to substantial swings
in either taxes or welfare services. While neither of these outcomes might
be politically acceptable, the issue arises as to how a welfare system can be
maintained which is not only fiscally sustainable, but which also oﬀers a fair
distribution profile across diﬀerent generations.
To address this challenge, several countries are now operating a medium-
term fiscal strategy of public debt reduction. This should help countries avoid
substantial cuts in existing welfare arrangements, yet without having to raise
taxes, when the projected increase in the demographic dependency ratio be-
comes more severe. By developing the capacity to absorb demographic changes
with stable taxes, a country would not only enjoy the eﬃciency gains associ-
ated with tax smoothing (Barro, 1979), but it would also be better protected
against adverse inter-generational distribution eﬀects.1
Provided that the underlying shock - in this case a rise in the demographic
dependency burden - is of a non-permanent kind, a saving (or pre-funding)
strategy can be seen as a sensible way of smoothing a fiscal adjustment. There-
fore, it is an important question whether the projected increase in the demo-
graphic dependency burden constitutes a temporary or a permanent shock.
While changing demographics may originate from shocks to fertility, mortality
and/or migration, it seems as if it is changes in mortality which tend to gener-
ate the most significant eﬀects on the dependency ratio (Andersen, Jensen and
Pedersen, 2005). Basically, this is because changes in future life expectancy im-
pact almost exclusively on the retired part of the population, whereas changes
in fertility and migration aﬀect individuals in all phases of life. This observa-
tion clearly assigns a critical role to changes in life expectancy.
Due to, e.g., advances within medical science, changes in life styles, more
flexible working conditions etc, the projected increases in longevity may well
be of a more permanent nature. If this is the case, the rise in the (old-age)
1However, uncertainty is inherent in demographic projections, and experience has shown
that they may be prone to radical changes, even within relatively short periods of time.
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dependency ratio could continue over a much longer period than typically en-
visaged, and a smoothing policy is not really what is called for. Also, evidence
suggests that the required amount of pre-funding is very sensitive to changes
in key economic variables, especially the interest rate and the rate of produc-
tivity growth, and this lack of robustness implies that there may be a need for
frequent changes in benefits and/or contribution rules. However, this would
not be consistent with the main objective of keeping these rules stable across
diﬀerent generations.
With existing age limits for eligibility to early retirement and pensions, a
longer lifetime will clearly lead to an increase in the proportion of life where an
individual is a net-recipient of welfare arrangements. However, since one would
expect an increase in life expectancy of future generations to be associated
with higher levels of welfare, the question could be raised whether current
generations should contribute to the financing hereof, as a pre-funding strategy
would imply. Rather, an obvious alternative to pre-funding would be to let
benefits and/or contribution rules depend on changes in life expectancy. For
example, by letting the age limits for retirement and pension follow expected
lifetime, it is indeed possible to condition both benefits and contributions on
expected lifetime.
Ideally, by introducing such a scheme the age limits become systematically
linked to the generation to which an individual belongs. Since current demo-
graphic projections imply that future generations can expect longer lifetimes,
it follows that those age limits would be higher for younger than for older gen-
erations. Generations expecting to live longer would therefore be active in the
labour market longer, and a better balance is ensured between the number of
years a person is a net-contributor and a net-recipient, respectively. Adjust-
ments to the system should be made at intervals - say, every 10 years. When
adjustments to changes in projections of expected lifetime are made well in
advance of the pension age, it follows that the risk arising from unanticipated
changes is smoothed over current and future generations.
In order to establish how a policy rule of longevity adjustment would aﬀect
intergenerational welfare distribution, as well as some broader macroeconomic
eﬀects, we need a formal model with overlapping generations, optimising indi-
vidual behaviour and demographic shocks. We have in this paper formulated
such an analytical framework by adapting, and then extending, a model first
suggested by Bohn (1998, 2001). We set out the basic structure of that model
in Section 2. Next, in Section 3, some macroeconomic responses to demo-
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graphic shocks are derived. Section 4 introduces the policy reform of longevity
adjustment. The focus here is on the potential of this initiative, compared
to tax policy adjustments, in order to redistribute welfare across generations.
Finally, Section 5 concludes and oﬀers some suggestions for future research.
2 The model
This section presents the basics of our analytical framework, which is a model
with overlapping generations (OLG) in the spirit of Diamond (1965) and ex-
tented by stochastic features in line with Bohn (2001). We first outline the
demographic details, next household behaviour, and finally resources and the
pension system.
2.1 Demographics
Individuals live for three periods: as children, as workers and as retirees, re-
spectively. The number of children born in period t is denoted by N ct , where
N ct = btN
w
t , and where bt > 0 is the birth rate, and N
w
t is the number of work-
ers living in period t. Adults work during period t (inelastic labour supply),
and they are retired during period t + 1. All individuals in each cohort are
assumed to be identical.
An increase in the birth rate clearly expands the labour force: the higher is
bt, the more children are born, and the larger is next period’s labour force. But
the size of the labour force is also determined by the probability of surviving
from childhood into the working period, µ1t, as well as by the length of the
working period, χt. If χt increases, for instance, the children now entering
as adults into the working period must work for a longer period of time, and
therefore the eﬀective growth rate of the labour force increases. Thus, the
eﬀective growth rate of the labour force is given by Nwt+1/N
w
t = µ1t+1χt+1bt. If
the probability of survival is 1, and with a standard working period normalised
at 1 (i.e., µ1t = χt = 1), the growth rate of the labour force is bt.
There is also a probablity of surviving from the working period into the
retirement period, µ2t. Both survival rates, µ1t and µ2t, and the total life-
time, φt, comprise an expected term and an unexpected term. Specifically,
µ1t = µ
e
1t−1µ
u
1t; µ2t = µ
e
2t−1µ
u
2t; and φt = φ
e
t−1φ
u
t where µ1t, µ2t ∈ (0, 1) and
φt ∈ (0, 2). The survival probabilities at the individual level are assumed to
equal the aggregate survival rate, and their stochastic terms, together with the
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stochastic components of φet−1, φ
u
t , bt and χt, are assumed to be identically and
independently distributed.
The total adult lifetime equals the sum of the length of the working period
and the retirement period. Thus, individuals initially have a total life time
endowment, and if the length of the working period increases, then the length
of the retirement period must decrease proportionally, as figure 1 illustrates.
 
    
Adult life time (   )  
Work (   ) Retirement (   ) 
Figure 1. Adult lifetime, work, and retirement
Formally, the length of retirement period, λ, is residually determined from
λt = φtµ2t − χt−1 = φet−1φut µe2t−1µu2t − χt−1, and is seen to be conditional on
survival into old age, where χt, λt ∈ (0, 1). Increases in the total lifetime could
also be envisaged. Clearly, if the length of the working period is unchanged,
an increase in total lifetime falls entirely on the length of life in the retirement
period.
2.2 Individual optimisation and household behaviour
Parents make decisions about consumption on behalf of themselves and their
children. With homothetic preferences, utility of generation t in the working
period (as parents) features the following specification,
U1t =
1
1− ηχt
£
ρw (Cwt )
1−η + btρc(bt) (C
c
t )
1−η¤ (1)
where Cwt is parents’ consumption, C
c
t is children’s consumption, ρ
w and ρc(bt)
are weights, and η > 0 is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution.2
Also, the length of the working period, χt, is assumed to enter positively, and
is included in a fashion similar to how Bohn (2001) incorporates the length of
retirement period in second period utiltity.3 The factor btρc(bt) is likely to be
2This specification of the utility function is quite standard. If the (inverse) elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is larger than 1, then utility decreases if consumption increases. If
η = 1, equation (1) simplifies to the log-utility function, Ut = χt
h
ρw lnCwt + btρc(bt) lnCct
i
,
in which case an increase in consumption yields an increase in utility. The construction of
the utility function with η > 1 is mainly meant to highlight the risk aversion motive.
3Auerbach and Hassett (2001, 2002) also incorporate the length of the retirement period.
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non-decreasing in the number of children, and is assumed to be positive but
less than ρw. There is no specific functional form imposed on ρc(bt), since in
later derivations it will only appear relative to ρw in the time preference for
consumption over period 1 and 2. The consumption constraint for generation
t in their working period is simply C1t = C
w
t + btC
c
t .
After maximising utility in period 1 subject to the consumption restriction,
the optimal level of first-period consumption, C1t , is derived. Subsequently the
indirect period-one utility function can be derived:4
U1t
¡
C1t
¢
=
1
1− η
h
χtρ1(bt)
¡
C1t
¢1−ηi
(2)
Surviving retirees are assumed to leave no bequests. In the retirement
period, utility is given by:
U2t+1
¡
C2t+1
¢
=
1
1− η
h
λt+1
¡
C2t+1
¢1−ηi
(3)
The aggregate intertemporal utility function for the household is an addi-
tive composite of the indirect utilities in the two periods and may be written
as,
Ut = U
1
t
¡
C1t
¢
+ ρ2U
2
t+1
¡
C2t+1
¢
(4)
where ρ2 > −1 is the discount rate of old age consumption. Upon inserting
(2) and (3) in (4), we get:
Ut =
1
1− η
h
χtρ1(bt)
¡
C1t
¢1−η
+
¡
φt+1µ2t+1 − χt
¢
ρ2
¡
C2t+1
¢1−ηi
(5)
Finally, consumption in the two periods can be written as follows,
χtC
1
t = Wt (1− θt)− St (6)
and,
C2t+1 =
∙
Rt+1
φt+1µ2t+1 − χt
¸
St + βt+1Wt+1 (7)
where Wt, βt, St, and Rt denote, respectively, wages, the replacement rate,
savings, and the return to capital.
4The term ρ1(bt) = ρw[1 + (ρc(bt)/ρw)1/ηbt]1−η + btρc(bt)(ρc(bt)/ρw)(1−η)/η denotes the
weight on first period consumption in the first period indirect utility.
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2.3 Resources and social security
Output is produced with capital and labour, according to the following Cobb-
Douglas technology,
Yt = K
α
t (AtN
w
t )
1−α (8)
where Kt is capital, At is productivity and α is the capital share. Produc-
tivity follows a stochastic trend, governed by At = (1 + at)At−1, where at is
the growth rate (identically and independently distributed). Each individual
supplies one unit of labour. The resource constraint of the economy is then
Yt + (1− δ)Kt = χtNwt C1t +
¡
φtµ2t − χt−1
¢
Nwt−1C
2
t +Kt+1 (9)
where δ is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock. Individuals’ savings
will be next period’s capital stock, i.e.:
Kt+1 = N
w
t St (10)
The public sector operates a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system
λtN
w
t−1βtWt = θtWtN
w
t (11)
where β (θ) denotes the benefit (contribution) rate. Equation (11) may fea-
ture both defined benefits (DB) and defined contribution (DC) schemes. For
example, in a DB system the replacement rate is fixed, and the contribution
rate varies. Solving for the endogenous contribution rate in a DB system, and
using that λt = φtµ2t − χt−1 and Nwt /Nwt−1 = 1 + nwt , yields
θt = βt
∙
φtµ2t − χt−1
1 + nwt
¸
(12)
Evidently, with the replacement rate held fixed, an increase in the pop-
ulation growth rate and an increase in the retirement age leads to a lower
contribution rate. Similarly, an increase in the length of the retirement period
and an increase in the probability of surving into the retirement period call for
a higher contribution rate.
Finally, it should be mentioned that in order to obtain a solution on the
balanced growth path we state the model in eﬀective units of labour such that,
for example, (C1/A)t ≡ c1t ; (C2/A)t ≡ c2t ; (W/A)t ≡ wt; Kt/(At−1Nwt−1) ≡ kt−1
and yt = [kt−1/ ((1 + at) (1 + nwt ))]
α.
This completes the presentation of the baseline OLG model.
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3 Equilibrium and responses to shocks
Before introducing the policy reform framework, this section oﬀers some illus-
trations of how the OLG model works when the existing pension system is
designed either as DC or DB, and when various shocks hit the economy. As a
starting point, we briefly outline the solution technique.
3.1 The solution technique
The model is first transformed into log-deviations from the steady state, and
then the method of undetermined coeﬃcients is used to obtain an analytical
solution for the recursive equilibrium. Adopting this analytical approach, the
nonlinear OLG model is replaced by a log-linearised approximate OLG model
with variables stated in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state.5
The log-linearised law of motion of any endogenous variable, bxt, as a func-
tion of the endogenous state variable, bkt−1, and any exogenous state variable,bzt, may be conjectured as follows:
bxt = πxkbkt−1 +X
z∈Z
πxzbzt (13)
where bxt = nbkt,bc1t ,bc2t , bwt, bRt,bθto
and
Z =
nbχt−1, bχt,bat,bbt−1,bbt, bµe1t−1, bµe1t, bµu1t, bφet−1, bφet , bφut , bµe2t−1, bµe2t, bµu2to
where πxk and πxz denote, respectively, the elasticity of bx with respect to
the endogenous state variable, bk, and the elasticity of bx with respect to the
exogenous state variables, bz. For example, the linear recursive equilibrium law
of motion for the capital stock can be written as:
bkt = πkkbkt−1 + πkχ1bχt−1 + πkχbχt + πkabat + πkb1bbt−1
+πkbbbt + πkµ1e1bµe1t−1 + πkµ1ebµe1t + πkµ1ubµu1t + πkφe1bφet−1
+πkφebφet + πkφubφut + πkµ2e1bµe2t−1 + πkµ2ebµe2t + πkµ2ubµu2t.
5The method is inspired by Campbell (1994), Uhlig (1999) and Bohn (1998, 2001, 2003),
and it has become standard practice in the context of Real Business Cycle (RBC) models.
However, in relation to stochastic OLG models this technique has, to our knowledge, not
been clearly documented elsewhere.
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The model is log-linearised around the steady state and solved using the
method of undetermined coeﬃcients. The equations which characterise the
equilibrium of the model are the following:
0 = Λ1bkt−1 − Λ5bkt − Λ3bc1t − Λ4bc2t + Λ4bχt−1 − Λ14bχt − Λ1bat (14)
−Λ2bµe1t−1 − Λ2bµu1t − Λ2bbt−1 − Λ4bφet−1 − Λ4bφut − Λ4bµe2t−1 − Λ4bµu2t
0 = −Λ7bc2t+1 + Λ9 bwt+1 + Λ12 bRt+1 + Λ12 bwt + Λ12bχt − Λ8bθt (15)
−Λ12bat − Λ12bφet − Λ12bφut+1 − Λ12bµe2t − Λ12bµu2t+1
0 = bRt+1 + Λ6bc1t − Λ6bc2t+1 − πρ1(b)bbt (16)bRt = −Λ10bkt−1 + Λ10bat + Λ10bµe1t−1 + Λ10bµu1t + Λ10bbt−1 + Λ10bχt (17)bwt = Λ11bkt−1 − Λ11bat − Λ11bµe1t−1 − Λ11bµu1t − Λ11bbt−1 − Λ11bχt (18)bθt = bφet−1 + bφut + bµe2t−1 + bµu2t − bχt−1 − bχt − bµe1t−1 − bµu1t −bbt−1 (19)
where (14) is the resource constraint; (15) is second period consumption; (16)
is the Euler equation; (17) is the return to capital; (18) is the wage rate; and
(19) is the pension contribution rate. The Λ’s denote the relevant coeﬃcients,
which comprise combinations of steady state variables.6
The next step is to present (14) to (19) in accord with (13) where the elas-
ticities in the law of motion appear explicitly. It turns out that the analytical
elasticities have fairly complex expressions, and to facilitate the interpretation
we therefore also report numerical elasticities. This involves calibrating the
model using what we believe are realistic parameter values, as shown in table
1, and simulating the model using a Matlab routine (available upon request).
6Further details on the specific derivations conducted in this paper using the method of
undetermined coeﬃcients are found in a separate note which is available upon request. For
a more general presentation of solution techniques relevant to stochastic OLG models, the
reader is referred to Jørgensen (2006).
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Parameter Calibration Interpretation
α 1/3 Capital share in output
δ 1 Rate of depreciation of capital
β 0.3 (0.1379) Replacement rate (payroll taxes)
a 0.35 Productivity growth rate
1/η 1/3 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
s 0.2 Savings rate
φ 1.3 Length of adult life
χ 0.8 Length of working period
λ N.A. Length of retirement period (residual)
b 0.1 Growth rate of the number of children
µ1 0.95 Probability of surviving into working period
µ2 1 Probability of surviving into retirement period
πρ1(b) 0 Elasticity of the weight of 1st period consumption
in utility with respect to current birth rate
Table 1. Calibration of the model
3.2 Economic eﬀects of demographic shocks
As to the eﬀects of demographic shocks on key economic variables, we focus on
shocks to fertility, bb, and to longevity, bφ, as well as to the retirement age, bχ.7
The relevant economic eﬀects include consumption possibilities for workers, bc1,
and retirees, bc2, respectively, and the capital stock, bk.
A shock to the birth rate A fall in the size of the working-age population,
as currently experienced by several OECD countries (UN, 2004), may originate
from a negative shock to the birth rate in an earlier period. The eﬀects of a
shock to the lagged birth rate, bbt−1, may be stated in terms of the relevant
analytical and numerical elasticities, see table 2. Note that we are assuming
a negative shock, so the elasticities in table 2 must be interpreted with the
opposite sign.
The following insights may be reported. First, the diﬀerence between DB
and DC systems is captured by the elasticity of the contribution rate with
7Much attention is devoted to the length of the retirement period, λ, which is derived
residually (λt = φtµ2t − χt−1). Since we calibrate χ with 0.8, φ with 1.3, and µ2 with 1,
then λ becomes 0.5.
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respect to a lower birth rate: In the pure DC system, πθb1 is 0 by definition,
while in the DB system it is equal to 1.
Policy coeﬀ. DB DC Analytical elasticity
πθb1 1 0
Eﬀect on:
πc2b1 0.3659 0.5057
(Λ8πθb1−Λ12πwb1)(Λ3Λ13πRk−Λ3πc2k−Λ5)
(Λ9πwk−Λ7πc2k+Λ12πRk)Λ4 −
Λ2
Λ4
πc1b1 −0.1018 −0.1981 (πc2k − Λ13πRk) πkb1
πkb1 −0.1421 −0.2764 Λ4πc2b1+Λ2Λ3Λ13πRk−Λ3πc2k−Λ5
Table 2. Economic eﬀects of a fertility shock
Second, a lower workforce has a negative eﬀect on the consumption possi-
bilities of retirees (πc2b1 = −0.3659). The reason is that retirees earn two types
of income: interest earnings on capital, and pension benefits. Since the latter
are fixed in a DB system, the only source of change to the consumption of re-
tirees stems from interest fluctuations which generate changes in rent earnings
on the capital stock owned by the retirees. This shows that the endogenous
response of factor prices plays a critical role: when the number of workers falls,
there is a rise in the capital-labour ratio, and the real rate of return to capital
falls and hence the capital income accruing to retirees will fall.
Third, the eﬀect on workers’ consumption possibilities, πc1b1, is more com-
plicated. On the one hand, with a fall in the number of workers, each worker
has to pay more taxes to finance the fixed benefits to retirees, which impacts
negatively on the consumption of workers. On the other hand, workers get
higher wages because of the higher capital-labour ratio. The net eﬀect is thus
ambiguous. With the parameter values in table 1, the "factor price eﬀect"
is seen to dominate the "fiscal eﬀect". In fact, we can state the necessary
condition under which the factor price eﬀect dominates the fiscal eﬀect. By
log-linearising workers’ income, c1t = wt (1− θt) /χt, around the steady state,
we get bc1t = bwt − θ1−θbθt − bχt, and we can then insert the law of motion, where
the elasticities have already been derived, for wages and contributions (see
equations (18) and (19)) to get bc1t = h−αbbt−1i − θ1−θ h−bbt−1i − bχt. Focusing
on a shock to lagged fertility of −1%, we obtain: bc1t = α − θ1−θ . So, provided
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that α > θ
1−θ the factor price eﬀect dominates the fiscal eﬀect.
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If the pension system is of the DC type, wages still increase due to the
higher capital-labour ratio, yielding a positive eﬀect on their consumption.
Workers pay fixed contributions to pensions, so there is no negative "fiscal
eﬀect" and the impact on consumption is unambiguously positive. However,
the total amount available to retirees is lower, and the replacement rate falls,
which naturally reduces consumption of retirees. The interest earnings will
still fall, due to the lower return on capital caused by the higher capital-labour
ratio. Thus, retirees will lose in terms of both types of their income. There is
a stronger transfer of risk between generations in the DB system compared to
the DC system, as reflected by the fact that the diﬀerence between πc1b1 and
πc2b1 is smaller in a DB than in a DC system, see table 2.
A shock to expected future longevity A shock of this kind will not
impact on the consumption of current retirees, because the capital-labour ratio
does not change. Since the contribution rate is not a function of the expected
future longevity (only of the current longevity, bφet−1), taxes cannot be used as a
policy instrument to reallocate risk in relation to this shock.9 Current workers,
however, anticipate a longer lifetime as retirees. They would therefore begin
to save more, by giving up current consumption (πc1φe = −0.2225), and the
capital stock would increase (πkφe = 0.8900), see table 3.
Policy coeﬀ. DB DC Analytical elasticity
πθφe N.A. N.A.
Eﬀect on:
πc2φe 0 0 N.A.
πc1φe −0.2225 −0.2587 πc2φe1 − Λ13πRφe1 + (πc2k − Λ13πRk) πkφe
πkφe 0.8900 1.0346
Λ3πc2φe1−Λ3Λ13πRφe1+Λ4πc2φe
Λ3Λ13πRk−Λ3πc2k−Λ5
Table 3. Economic eﬀects of a longevity shock.
8The value of θ is derived through calibration for β = 0.3 such that θ1−θ = 0.16. With a
value of α = 1/3, the pension system must be relatively large (with contribution rates above
30% before this result is overturned.
9However, the retirement age, bχt, could be used, as we will discuss in the next section.
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In the DB system the increase in the expected future longevity will require
higher contributions in the future, while in the DC system contributions will
not vary and current workers will have to save more, since the risk is not
shared with future workers. Concequently, the DC system will again magnify
the results of the DB system.
A shock to the retirement age A positive shock to the retirement age
means that an individual must work for a longer time horizon, and the length
of the retirement period is residually lowered. Like a shock to lagged fertil-
ity, this aﬀects the labour force and hence the capital-labour ratio. With a
shorter retirement period, the need for savings would fall, and a higher level of
consumption is available to workers. However, consumption in the now longer
working period would now be spread over more sub-periods. In a DB system,
the net eﬀect on savings is negative (πkχ = −1.0345), see table 4.
Policy coeﬀ. DB DC Analytical elasticity
πθχ −1 0
Eﬀect on:
πc2χ 0.3659 0.5057
(Λ8πθχ−Λ12πwχ)(Λ3Λ13πRk−Λ3πc2k−Λ5)
(Λ9πwk−Λ7πc2k+Λ12πRk)Λ4 −
Λ2
Λ4
πc1χ 0.1207 0.0606 πc2χ1 − Λ13πRχ1 + (πc2k − Λ13πRk)πkχ
πkχ −1.0321 −1.3111 Λ3πc2χ1−Λ3Λ13πRχ1+Λ4πc2χ+Λ2Λ3Λ13πRk−Λ3πc2k−Λ5
Table 4. Economic eﬀects of delayed retirement.
The capital-labour ratio falls since the labour force has increased. This
produces lower wages and a higher return on savings, as reflected in more
consumption available to retirees (πc2χ = 0.3659). Lower wages would also in
itself cause a fall in workers’ consumption. However, each worker now needs
to pay less contributions to the DB pension system, which points to increase
workers’ consumption. With the chosen parameter values, the net eﬀect is
positive (πc1χ = 0.1207). Clearly, with fixed contributions, as in a DC system,
retirees gain even more. This is so because of the higher return on the capital
stock, but also because contributions are fixed and there are more sub-periods
for taxation (πc2χ = 0.5057). And since the workers pay contributions over a
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longer period, their gains are smaller in the DC system compared to the DB
system.
While several other types of shocks could be studied, there is already
enough material to make the point that within a very passive policy frame-
work, such as a public pension system operating on a period-by-period basis,
demographic shocks may lead to highly unequal distributions of consumption
possibilities across generations. For that reason it is worth considering an al-
ternative more active policy adjustment in order to achieve more equitable
outcomes following demographic shocks. This is the aim of the next section.
4 Evaluating alternative policy rules
4.1 Performance criteria
When studying the eﬀects of demographic shocks we have seen that two main
forces are operating: first, the (endogenous) factor price eﬀect and, second,
the fiscal eﬀect originating from the pension system. The latter constitutes
the (passive) policy rule which plays a major role for how the welfare eﬀects
of demographic shocks are distributed across generations. In general, it was
found that the fiscal eﬀects were not suﬃcient to counteract the factor price
eﬀects and, consequently, workers and retirees were exposed diﬀerently to the
demographic shocks.10
In order to evaluate the social desirability of the results obtained in section
3, we would want to compare those results to a socially optimal allocation
derived from a social welfare function. If the optimal allocation diﬀers from
the allocation found in the previous section, we may need to consider redis-
tributional policies. This immediately raises the question as to how the social
10From the specification of the pension system in (11) it is clear that the contribution
rate, θ, will change if the lagged fertility rate, b1, changes. The magnitude of this change
will be in equal proportion to the size of the shock to lagged fertility, and this is accounted
for in the equivalent log-linearised equation (19) in terms of πθb1. Therefore, the automatic
(passiv) change in contributions, and thus in the "fiscal eﬀect",
³
θ
1−θ
´
, of bbt−1 = πθb1 = 1%.
We have shown that the "factor price eﬀect" dominates the "fiscal eﬀect" for a reasonable
size of the pension system (β = 0.3 and thus θ = 0.1379). This is the key fiscal mechanism
that has the potential to redistribute income across generations living in the same period.
As a result, the higher (more active) is πθb1 the stronger is the fiscal eﬀect, and the more
likely is it that the fiscal eﬀect will oﬀset the factor price eﬀects - and hence that risks will
be shared more equally across generations.
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welfare function should be formulated.
Specifically, we assume that aggregate social welfare can be measured as:
Wt = E
½ ∞P
t=−1
ΦtNwt Ut
¾
=
©
Φt−1Nwt−1Ut−1 + ΦtNwt Ut
ª
(20)
where Φ is the weight on the utility of a given generation. The problem of the
policy maker is now to maximise (20), subject to the resource constraint in (9)
and the lifetime utility function, as given by (5). Assuming that all generations
are weighted equally (Φt−1 = Φt), the eﬃciency condition (in log-deviations
from the steady state) may be stated as follows:
bc1t = bc2t + ¡πρ1(b)/η¢bbt (21)
where the factor ρ1(?bt) is assumed to be log-linearised as πρ1(b)
bbt, and where
πρ1(b) is the elasticity of the weight of first period consumption in utility with
respect to the current birth rate.11 If there is no shock to the current birth rate,
(21) states that the condition for an eﬃcient risk sharing (Bohn, 2001) is that
the percentage change in the consumption of workers equals the percentage
change in consumption of retirees. The key implication of a policy reform is
thus a redistribution of income. If the equilibrium generated by a passive policy
rule in the presence of demographic shocks is characterised by unequal changes
in diﬀerent generations’ consumption possibilities, then the government should
"correct" this outcome, by redistributing income from workers to retirees (or
vice versa) up to the point where both generations bear the burden (or share
the gains) of shocks in equal proportions.
Intergenerational redistribution could either be achieved through changes
in the contribution rate (or the benefit rate) of the pension system, or through
structural (or labour market) reforms by changes in the retirement age. The
potential of the latter has only been explored to a very limited extent com-
pared to the former. Yet, from a policy perspective, it would be of interest to
consider an alternative way of coping with demographic changes rather than
through adjustments to the contribution and/or benefit rates of the public
PAYG pension system. More promising, however, might be reforms which af-
fect the number of retirees or workers, or the lifetime labour supply of each
worker, through the introduction of a link between longevity changes and the
retirement age.
11The derivation of this optimality condition is documented in a separate note, which is
available upon request.
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The shock we consider is a "composite shock", taking the form of a negative
shock to lagged fertility and a positive shock to expected future longevity. Our
motivation for focusing on these shocks is their empirical relevance: the fall in
the lagged fertility rate reminds us of the so-called "baby bust" phenomenon
in the 1970-80s, and an expectation about increased longevity has become
common ground among social and medical scientists. Indeed, due to changes
in life-style and advances in medical science, people are expected to live longer
in the future (UN, 2005).
4.2 Results
Taxation as policy instrument Basically, the idea is to solve for the re-
sponse of the contribution rate which ensures an eﬃcient allocation of risk
for the composite shock in accord with (21). Since taxes cannot respond to a
shock to bφet , but only to bbt−1, we choose to denote the eﬃcient response of taxes
for the composite shock by π∗θb1. Leaving out the details of the derivation, we
find:
π∗θb1 =
πc2φe − πc1φe
Ω7 − Ω9
bφet/bbt−1 + Ω8 − Ω10Ω7 − Ω9 πwb1 − Ω11Ω7 − Ω9 (22)
where the Ω0s comprise steady state variables and other elasticities.12 With
the parameter values reported in table 1, the numerical elasticity of the con-
tribution rate with respect to the composite amounts to π∗θb1 = −2.04. Recall
that the empirically relevant shock to lagged fertility is negative and to ex-
pected future longevity is positive. Thus, an optimal risk sharing implies an
increase in the tax rate of about 2%.
It would be interesting to compare the eﬀects obtained with a passive rule
to the results obtained with an active response. With the above parameter
values, we get bc1t = πc1b1bbt−1 + πc1φebφet = −0.12 and bc2t = πc2b1bbt−1 + πc2φebφet =
−0.37. In words, workers’ consumption stand to decrease by about 0.12% while
that of retirees is expected to decrease by 0.37%. The pension contribution
rate is designed to automatically respond to the 1%-shocks by also increasing
proportionally by 1%, but this is not enough to ensure equal sharing of the
risks associated with the shocks. As shown, we find that the tax rate must
increase by about 2 percentage points, in order to transfer enough income from
workers to retirees to achieve eﬃcient risk sharing across generations. When
this active fiscal policy is adopted both generations bear the burdens exactly
12We again refer to a separate note (available upon request) for the details.
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in equal proportions by a decrease in consumption of about 0.22% for both
workers and retirees (i.e. bc1t = bc2t = −0.22). Thus, when the contribution rate
is used to guarantee an eﬃcient risk sharing, there is a net welfare loss on the
part of both generations. Against that, it would be of interest to see if a better
outcome could be achieved, and this is the objective of the remainder of the
paper.
4.2.1 Retirement age as policy instrument
From an analytical perspective, it is not really straightforward how a change
in the retirement age should be conceptualized.13 An increase in the length of
the working period can, in principle, be thought of in two diﬀerent ways. First,
workers could simply choose to work more years for some exogenous reason(s),
or, second, it could be the result of a government policy designed such that
the age limit for eligibility to pension benefits of a representative worker is
postponed. In the latter case we would assume that people are induced to
work for this extra sub-period of what in any case is "working life". In this
analysis it is assumed that people do not want to cover their expenses out of
savings in this extra sub-period, which previously was part of the retirement
period. Instead, they decide to work this extra sub-period until they become
recipients of ordinary pension benefits.
Within the formal framework set out above, this discussion is captured
by the parameter bχt, which denotes "the change in the length of the working
period from its steady state value". For example, one can think of bχt as an
exogenous shock to the supply of labour such as a change in people’s perception
of work which is not derived from the model structure. It is also possible to
think of bχt as a policy variable, which the policy maker can change as part of,
say, a labour market reform.
In the following we adopt the practice of treating bχt as an exogenous vari-
able, and allowing it to be used as a policy parameter. We then impose the
condition for eﬃcient risk sharing (21) on the recursive equilibrium law of mo-
tion for the consumption of workers and retirees, respectively. Solving for the
optimal length of the working period in accord with (21), bχ∗t , yields
bχ∗t = ω1bbt−1 + ω2bφet (23)
13Cutler (2001), in his comment on Bohn (2001), suggests an extension of Bohn’s model
to incorporate the length of the working period.
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where the coeﬃcients ω1 and ω2 comprise steady state variables and other
elasticities. Assuming the shocks to be −1% for lagged fertility and +1% for
expected future longevity, this will lead to an eﬃcient policy response of an
increase in the retirement age of exactly 1%. In fact, the two shocks generate
dynamics which oﬀset each other. Using the parameter values of table 1, a
numerical analysis shows that retirees are aﬀected by −0.3659 from bbt−1; by
0 from bφet ; and by 0.3659 from bχt. Similarly, workers experience a response
of 0.1018 from bbt−1; −0.2225 from bφet ; and 0.1207 from bχt. Note that both
retirees and workers experience the combination of three shocks, but the net
eﬀect is zero for both generations. Importantly, this is assuming a policy
response of 1% for bχt. This could also be regarded from the perspective of an
eﬃcient policy reponse of bχt. For a shock only to bbt−1 then bχt = 1.9074, andbχt = −0.9074 for a shock only to bφet . By adding these eﬀects, we get exactly
the result corresponding to bχt = 1%.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: A negative shock to bbt−1
will reduce the current labour force, and a positive shock to bχ will oﬀset this
reduction. The other feature of the shock is in connection with the retirement
period. A positive shock to bχt will lead to a lower expected retirement period,
while a positive bφet will oﬀset it. This is because the length of the retirement
period is modelled to be residually determined from changes in the length of
the working period and the total length of life (λt+1 = φt+1µ2t+1 − χt). As
such, a policy response of bχt = 1% will oﬀset all eﬀects stemming from the two
demographic shocks.
This result indicates that the retirement age is a better policy instrument
than the contribution rate. Indeed, the utility eﬀect from employing taxes
would generate a utility loss for both generations of (bc1t = bc2t = −0.2207 given
that π∗θb1 = 2.0388). When employing the retirement age as policy instrument
there will not be any utility loss for either generation (bc1t = bc2t = 0 given thatbχt = 1%). This result, among other assumptions, is based on the choice of
modelling, incorporating with equal weights in utility both the length of the
working period and the length of the retirement period for each generation (χt
and λt+1).
Finally, we have found that this result is robust over both a DB and a
DC PAYG regime, and also in a model without any pension system. Diﬀerent
combinations of shocks could be analysed, but the empirically most relevant
shock is the one covered in this paragraph. While much more academic work is
needed in this area, it seems reasonable to suggest that an indexation scheme
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of retirement age relative to expected longevity, in order to ensure intergener-
ationally eﬃcient risk sharing, would be a sensible policy adjustment.
5 Concluding remarks
Based on a stochastic OLG model, this paper has shown how various demo-
graphic shocks may aﬀect the intergenerational distribution of welfare. The
paper has also discussed how policy rules may be designed in order to achieve
outcomes which are more equitable compared to outcomes obtained within a
passive policy framework.
The novelty of the paper is a study of longevity adjustment of the retirement
age as an instrument to generate eﬃcient risk sharing in an economy faced by
demographic shocks. We find that a rise in the retirement age following an
increase in expected longevity may leave both workers and retirees better oﬀ.
However, this is not the case within an alternative setting where taxes on
wage incomes are adjusted to share risks eﬃciently across generations. So, the
retirement age outperforms taxes as a policy instrument.
While we feel convinced that the analytical framework used in this paper
oﬀers a fruitful starting point for studying an important policy area, we are
also aware of several limitations and extensions that we want to address in
future research.
First, the supply of labour is assumed exogenous in our analysis, and an
obvious extension would therefore be to introduce endogenous labour supply
decisions by households. While this would raise a number of technical com-
plexities, important insights could be obtained into the eﬀects of a higher
retirement age on labour supply. For example, would an increase in labour
supply at the extensive margin be oﬀset by a fall in the endogenous labour
supply at the intensive margin? In any case, appropriate policy measures
would need to take into account the endogeneity of labour supply.
Second, it is also feasible to endogenise other variables and solve for addi-
tional dynamics, which are absent in this paper. Future research could include
endogenous human capital formation (through, e.g., education), and endoge-
nous fertility decisions in order to address the reasons behind the negative
shock to fertility in the 1970s and 1980s.
Third, while the present analysis is stated in terms of a closed economy, it
would be of interest to consider an open economy perspective. For example, in
the case of a small open economy, one would need to specify the structure of
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the OLGmodel diﬀerently and incorporate an exogenously determined interest
rate.
Fourth, in relation to the probability distributions of the exogenous state
variables, one could specify detailed distributions instead of the i.i.d. speci-
fication which we follow. As such, a more accurate picture of the stochastic
properties of the demographics could be obtained.
Finally, to study the welfare eﬀects of demographic shocks to the sustain-
ability of public finances, a more detailed government sector could be incor-
porated into the model. Some, if not all, of the above extensions we have in
mind for our future research in this area.
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